Social Engineering 101 by Kontio, Mika
Bachelor's thesis 
Business Information Technology 
Business Data Communications and Information Security 
2016 
 
 
 
 
Mika Kontio 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING 101  
BACHELOR'S THESIS | ABSTRACT 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES 
Business Information Technology | Business Data Communications and Information Security 
2016 | 67 
Jarkko Paavola (Turku University of Applied Sciences) 
Mika Kontio 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING 101 
This thesis was carried out in collaboration with Phirelight Security Solutions Inc. which is a 
Canadian information security company. The practical part of this thesis was commissioned by 
them. The purpose of the thesis was to create an all-inclusive handbook that outlines different 
social engineering methods and give the reader a basis on how to protect themselves against 
social engineering attacks. 
The main research method was finding previous experiences of social engineering attacks from 
the Internet as well as research the psychology behind manipulating people and their behavior 
based on literature on the subject. The references used in the analysis of the techniques were 
mostly collected from various scientific publications while the case study references were 
collected principally but not exclusively from various reputable online publications. 
The result of the research is a simple but comprehensive study which is meant to educate the 
reader with the help of examples of real life scenarios and incidents. The practical experiment 
carried out as the commission of Phirelight Security Solutions Inc. further underlines the 
importance of understanding why guarding one’s own personal information is important as well 
as why everyone working in a modern corporate environment should always be aware of social 
engineering attacks and how they work. 
This thesis as a whole is meant to be used as a beginner’s guide for understanding social 
engineering attacks. It does not include each and every single method used for these attacks. 
The intent has been to bring every reader's awareness to an acceptable level while maintaining 
a reasonable length for this publication. The Phirelight experiment has resulted in the company 
offering this kind of a service to its customers as well. 
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SOSIAALISEN MANIPULOINNIN PERUSTEET 
Opinnäytetyön aihe oli sosiaalisen manipuloinnin perusteet ja hyökkäystavat. Päätavoitteena oli 
luoda kattava opas, jota voidaan käyttää koulutustarkoituksiin. Tästä syystä opinnäytetyö on 
kirjoitettu englanniksi. Opinnäytetyön tukena toteutettiin myös pienimuotoinen koe, jossa testattiin 
kanadalaisen tietoturvayhtiö Phirelight Security Solutions Inc:n sisäistä valmiutta sosiaaliseen 
manipulointiin perustuviin hyökkäyksiin. 
Tutkimus- ja kirjoitustyö tapahtui kvalitatiivisena tutkimuksena ja toimintatutkimuksena. 
Pääkysymyksenä oli selvittää, mistä syystä sosiaalinen manipulointi on helpoin hyökkäysmetodi 
tietoturvamaailmassa ja tästä näkökulmasta kirjoittaa opas sen torjumiseen. Tutkimuksen tukena 
käytetty aineisto koostui internetistä haetuista julkaisuista samoin kuin kirjallisista teoksista. 
Opinnäytetyöhön kuuluu myös case-tutkimus, jossa analysoitiin kolmea tietomurtoa, joissa 
jokaisessa käytettiin hyväksi sosiaaliseen manipulointiin perustuvia hyökkäysmetodeja. 
Phirelightilla suoritettu koe toteutettiin konstruktiivisena tutkimuksena, jonka toisena tavoitteena 
oli selvittää voisiko vastaavaa palvelua tarjota myös asiakkaille tulevaisuudessa. 
Tutkimustyön keskeisimmät tulokset olivat samoja opinnäytetyön jokaisessa osuudessa. 
Perimmäisimpiä syitä sosiaalisen manipuloinnin helppoudelle ovat ihmisten opitut 
käyttäytymissäännöt ja -ohjeet, jotka tekevät käytöksestä helposti ennakoitavaa. Tästä seuraa 
väistämättä se, että myös ihmisiä on mahdollista hakkeroida käyttämällä hyväksi heidän valmiiksi 
opittuja käyttäytymismalleja. Ihmisten luontaista käyttäytymistä ei myös voi päivittää samaan 
tapaan kuin tietoturva-aukon sisältävää ohjelmaa. Phirelightilla suoritettu koe osoitti saman 
todeksi, kun noin kolmannes työntekijöistä antoi oikeat käyttäjätunnuksensa sähköpostin kautta 
välitetylle phishing-sivulle. 
Tutkimustulosten pohjalta keskeisin johtopäätös on että yritysmaailmassa viime kädessä 
tietoturvasta ovat vastuussa aina työntekijät itse, eikä yrityksen sisäiseen turvallisuuteen 
erikoistunut elin. Sosiaaliseen manipulointiin perustuvat hyökkäykset kohdistuvat usein niin 
laajaan yleisöön, että niiden estäminen on käytännössä mahdotonta. Tästä syystä tehokkain 
puolustus on kouluttaa ihmiset niitä vastaan. Phirelightilla toteutettu koe johtanee kyseisenlaisen 
testauspalvelun ja koulutuksen tarjoamiseen myös asiakkaille. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Baiting Using a promise of an item or goods to entice the victim to 
act in a desired way (Bisson 2015). 
CMS Content Management System is a system used to manage 
the contents of a website without deeper knowledge of 
HTML (TechTarget 2011). 
CTO Chief Technology Officer is an individual overseeing the 
technology in the company and has knowledge of both busi-
ness and technology (TechTarget 2013). 
DoS Denial of Service is an attack where the attacker uses a sin-
gle connection to cause harm to the functionality of the Inter-
net facing service (Imperva 2016). 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service is an attack where the attacker 
uses multiple devices and connections to flood and drown 
the target in a big volume of traffic (Imperva 2016). 
Excel Excel is a part of Microsoft Office family used for manipulat-
ing tables (Microsoft 2016). 
Hash Hash is a string created from another string with a one-way 
algorithm with the goal of protecting the original string (De-
fuse Security 2014). 
ICS Industrial Control System is a command and control network 
designed to support industrial processes (ENISA 2016). 
IRC Internet Relay Chat is a program and protocol used for com-
municating in real time with people from all over the world 
(irchelp.org 2013). 
JS JavaScript is a programming language mainly used for mak-
ing interactive webpages (About.com 2014). 
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions is an Internet standard 
meant for expanding the functionality of the regular email 
(Techopedia Inc. 2016a). 
Phishing Phishing means the act of seeking to obtain personal or sen-
sitive information by tricking the victim to reveal it (Bisson 
2015). 
Trojan Trojan is a type of malware that is disguised as a legitimate 
software (Kaspersky Lab 2016). 
SE Social Engineering means influencing and manipulating peo-
ple without their knowledge towards a goal (Social Engineer 
Inc. 2016a). 
Steam Steam is a video gaming marketplace and hub software 
made by Valve Corporation (Valve Corporation 2016a). 
Steam Guard Steam Guard is essentially Steam’s 2-factor authentication 
component (Valve Corporation 2015). 
Spear phishing Spear phishing means phishing that targets a smaller group 
of people and tailoring the attacks with greater precision 
(Hoffman 2013). 
Salting a hash Salting means adding another string to the original string be-
fore hashing it so that the attacker cannot guess the original 
string just from the hash (Defuse Security 2014). 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol is a TCP/IP protocol meant for 
storing and forwarding email (What is My IP Address 2016). 
SSH Secure Shell is a protocol used for accessing a remote 
server safely in an encrypted session (The Computer Lan-
guage Company In. 2016). 
SSL Secure Sockets Layer is a standard technology used for cre-
ating encrypted connection between the client and the server 
(DigiCert Inc. 2016). 
SSN Social Security Number is varying length number and alpha-
bet combination string used for identifying people (In-
vestopedia LLC. 2016). 
SWAT Special Weapons And Tactics is a special team working un-
der FBI assembled for extremely high-risk situations (FBI 
2016). 
Swatting Swatting means calling the authorities in the US with the in-
tent of getting SWAT to deploy at victim’s address because 
of a fake distress call (Fagone 2015). 
TLS Transport Layer Security is essentially the newer version of 
SSL (PC Plus 2012). 
URL Uniform Resource Locator is a reference to a resource on 
the Internet though it can be used for local network re-
sources as well (Oracle 2015). 
VM Virtual Machine is virtualized software computer running in-
side a real bare-metal computer (VMware Inc. 2016). 
VPS Virtual Private Server is a virtualized server that mimics a 
real dedicated server (Markle 2015). 
Waterholing Waterholing or water hole attack means for example that the 
attacker has infected a legit website and waits for their real 
target to visit it (Grimes 2013). 
Zero-day/0-day 0-day vulnerability is a hole or bug in software unknown to 
the vendor and which is exploited (PC Tools 2016).
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this thesis rose from the realization how prevalent Social Engi-
neering (SE) is in the business world and among ordinary people today. My stud-
ies have been primarily focused on writing code, configuring networks and of 
course information security. Social engineering however has been only glanced 
at even though in 2015 the annual costs of phishing attacks alone were $3.77 
million for the average company. Social engineering attacks are frequently un-
derestimated especially in corporations even though just by preparing the em-
ployees against these kinds of attacks with basic training would substantially re-
duce phishing-related costs (Ponemon Institute 2015, 1.)  
Social engineering is perhaps the easiest approach when attacking any individual 
or organization. Its main strength is the fact that the attacker can get other people 
to do their work for them. My personal experience is that once you learn about 
phishing, baiting and other types of social engineering attacks you start spotting 
them in your day-to-day life as well. As for the question who will fall a victim to 
social engineering there really is not a single answer to, though there are clearly 
some groups of people that seem to be more susceptible to frauds (FINRA 2013, 
6). No one is perfect though and everyone can make mistakes. Humans are cu-
rious beings by nature and our inquisitive nature is one of the reasons we origi-
nally came to realize there is a whole new world in the savannahs near our trees. 
From the information security professional’s point of view it is just too bad that 
our natural reaction when encountering new and exciting things is trust before 
doubt. 
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2 SOCIAL ENGINEERING – WHAT IS IT? 
By one definition social engineering means “any act that influences a person to 
take an action that may or may not be in their best interest” (Social Engineer Inc. 
2016a). This pretty much encompasses the whole term in one sentence, but to 
really understand the meaning of it we need to explore it a bit further. 
2.1 History of Social Engineering 
Social engineering is not by any means a new phenomenon. Throughout the 
years people have found ways to influence the way others act in certain situations 
and take advantage of it. Probably the most known historical example of SE is of 
course the Trojan Horse from Odyssey by Homer. The tale is so famous that we 
have even named a malware family after it. In the story the Greeks have fought 
a long war with the Trojans and finally feign giving up the battle. The Trojans see 
the last ship of the Greeks sailing off into the sunset and to further support their 
story the Greeks have left one warrior to stay behind and spin a tale of their retreat 
and symbol of surrender, the actual wooden hollow Trojan Horse. Naturally dur-
ing their celebration the Trojans are killed by the Greeks who emerge from inside 
the horse. From a contemporary point of view the tale might not seem as genius 
as it actually was. Whether or not the story actually happened is not relevant, it 
is the elements of it that matter.  
Today anyone hearing the story probably would not be surprised by the hollow 
horse but the point is that in that time period no one could not even imagine such 
a thing. In this day and age we have come to expect plot twists and unexpected 
outcomes from all the tales we see in TV or movies, but a few thousand years 
ago the stories people told each other lacked the same kind of a structure. These 
stories essentially shape how we perceive the world and at the time of Homer 
writing the Odyssey people had a different view of the world. The idea of a hollow 
wooden horse was completely new and different. The same principle holds true 
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with all SE. People act based on things they have learned previously in life and 
they expect the outcomes of actions and events to be predictable. 
2.2 Psychology of Social Engineering 
The human brain excels in creating habits. The brain in a way is a machine, and 
everything it does consumes resources, which means energy. From the brain’s 
perspective the optimal situation is using as little energy as possible. This is why 
we create patterns in our everyday life, such as having a coffee when we arrive 
at work, smoking a cigarette after 10 o’clock or reading the news while having 
lunch. The patterns save energy, an individual does not have to think about what 
they are going to do next all the time (925 TV 2012.) In the computer world the 
hacker finds a way to trick a program that is supposed to accomplish task X into 
doing task Y while still staying inside the limitations of the program. The same 
kind of a mindset is present in SE as well. When you know how people react in 
certain situations it is easy to abuse these existing behavioral models to achieve 
your real goal. 
Social engineering is not anything new, that much we have already established. 
That does, however, raise the question how come it has not really been acknowl-
edged until modern times? Partly this is because the root of social engineering, 
psychology, did not really exist as its own branch of science before a German 
professor Wilhelm Wundt founded the first laboratory dedicated solely to psychol-
ogy in 1879 in the University of Leipzig. Wundt’s research was focused on the 
test participants’ reactions to external stimuli, for example he would expose par-
ticipants to the sound of metronome and ask them to report their sensations 
(McLeod 2008.) While this is still far from studying facial micro expressions it was 
a good start. Wundt is also known for many of his students that became famous 
psychologists as well, such as Edward Titchener who continued his work. 
Wundt’s view on the mind was called structuralism, or the study of the basic ele-
ments that constitute the mind. Whereas Wundt focused on the relationships be-
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tween the elements of the consciousness, Titchener gave his attention to the in-
dividual elements. The structuralist approach had it faults though and it went out 
of fashion so to speak because the results of experiments were hard to repro-
duce. The results were not unambiguous, which is the basic requirement for sci-
entific theory to hold any merit (Schacter etc. 2011, 8-9.) 
There is, however, one important thing to take away from all of this: while people 
do react to stimuli in somewhat predictable ways, all people are still individuals. 
What might cause an outrage in one person might produce a laughter in another. 
A successful social engineer keeps this in mind and does not use the same tricks 
for different people. 
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3 SOCIAL TECHNIQUES 
Social engineering is a very wide phenomenon, but I will try to cover most of its 
more common techniques. SE is more of an art form than a set of certain skills 
and this is why it is easier to try and understand it by looking at the steps most 
attacks follow. Even though SE has more in common with psychology than IT, 
the mindset needed for it is very similar to that of a regular hacker’s. This is why 
defending against it is easiest by understanding how the attacks work. According 
to Interpol (2016) social engineering frauds typically follow the same four steps: 
gathering information, developing a relationship, exploiting any identified vulner-
abilities and the execution. This is pretty much true in cases where social engi-
neering means actual interaction between the attacker and the target. In this 
chapter I will go through most of the social techniques used in various parts of 
the attacks. Later on we will discuss the sort of SE that does not require the at-
tacking party to maintain a personal connection to the victim. 
3.1 Doxing 
Gathering information, or doxing like I am going to refer to it from now on, is by 
far the most important part of any successful attack. Doxing is something that is 
hard at first to master but once you get the hang of it, it is surprising how much 
information you can find online from a previously completely unknown person. 
Doxing is the most important part of all attacks because it creates the base on 
which the rest is built on. Once you know the target’s name, home address, social 
security number and perhaps even the spouse’s name, it is relatively easy to 
impersonate the target and gain even more information about them. Many people 
underestimate the power they are giving to complete strangers just by posting 
their hometown in their pseudo-anonymous Instagram account. By having a 
name and the city the possible results are already narrowed down greatly. Per-
sonally I have the guilty pleasure of doxing online all the new people I meet and 
it does not usually take longer than 10 minutes to find the person’s Facebook 
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page just with their forename and hometown. It just takes some patient page-
scrolling, nothing more. 
One of the most recent cases of big information leaks happened in December 
when Valve’s popular gaming and digital store platform Steam allowed by mis-
take its users to view each other’s store pages. People were able to see other 
users’ billing addresses, the last four digits of their Steam Guard phone number, 
their purchase history, the last two digits of their credit card number and/or their 
email address. The incident only lasted for about an hour or two but the damage 
was already done. The fault was apparently in bad caching rules that were de-
ployed because of the simultaneous Denial of Service (DoS) attack as well as a 
huge volume of users browsing the store during the holiday sales (Valve Corpo-
ration 2016b.) This level of detail from anyone is the holy grail of a social engi-
neer. The details revealed make it possible to impersonate the targets very con-
vincingly. Because of the random nature of the leak it is hard to estimate the real 
damages of the incident. Furthermore having a person’s billing address allows 
the malicious person to cause even actual damage to the target. In his video 
podcast the video games critic John Bain, or Totalbiscuit as he is known online, 
expressed his worries over the matter as well. Bain is known as a very vocal critic 
in the video game world and his opinions are often very straightforward have a 
tendency to irritate many people. In his case it would be a completely legit fear 
that if someone obtained his home address this way, they might swat him for 
example (Totalbiscuit, The Cynical Brit 2015.) Swatting in this case means the 
phenomenon present mostly in the US where the malicious person calls the 
emergency authorities with the false pretense that some serious crime is taking 
place in the victim’s address. The goal of the attacker is to get the law enforce-
ment Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team deployed there. Swatting is 
one of the more deviant ways an attacker can use just the target’s home address 
to cause harm to them (Fagone 2015.) 
Besides impersonating the target or causing actual harm to them, the contact 
details give the attacker other kind of power as well. I used to work one summer 
as a telemarketer and we were using this software that was doing the calling for 
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us. In the software we could see all the contact information of the person we were 
calling apart from their Social Security Number (SSN). Our goal was to sell them 
these new electricity contracts and we had a sales speech already written for us. 
The speech was formatted in a way that made the possible customer think that 
we were calling on behalf of their electricity company and we wanted just to up-
date their contract when in reality we were selling them a completely new contract 
from another company. In the beginning of the call we would first check the name 
of the person answering the call, “This is John Doe, right?” After checking the 
name we would “verify” if the address we had was correct for the person in ques-
tion. I will discuss this even more further on but the whole point of the beginning 
of the call is to make sure the callee answers yes on two occasions. This was a 
way to create a feeling for the potential customer that we know exactly who he or 
she was and we were in control and they could trust us. Today people have grown 
accustomed to telemarketers and they are already wary of anyone calling from 
an unknown number and most people rejected all offers once they realized I was 
actually selling something. The people most receptive to my offer were mostly the 
elderly and occasionally the young adults. The deceitful nature of the company I 
was working in was completely unknown to us regular employees. No one told 
us that we were in a way scamming the customers. All we knew the boss had 
given us a handout to read and a program to handle all the calling for us. We did 
not suspect anything until we started receiving somewhat sour feedback from the 
customers who had been previously contacted by some other telemarketing com-
pany selling the same electricity contracts. Needless to say I did not stay for long 
there after I learned about the true nature of my work. 
But how did the company get the addresses and contact information of all the 
people on the list besides their phone numbers? The answer is in your everyday 
supermarket. Remember those competitions that sometimes pop up in their small 
stands next to some lonely aisle with the headline “Participate for a chance to win 
a brand new Ferrari”? To participate just fill the form with your contact information. 
This is why telemarketers sometimes call even those people who have set their 
phone numbers unlisted or like in some countries they have listed their numbers 
in a service that is supposed to prevent telemarketing calls. If anything people 
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should always remember there is no such thing as a free meal. Google’s Gmail 
is only free because it keeps you using Google and therefore letting Google know 
what you are doing online. The same goes with Facebook as well. The currency 
you are paying with is information about yourself, what kind of ice-cream you like, 
what kind of social circles you have and even the more personal matters such as 
what kind of sexual preferences you have. Information is always power and in 
social engineering it is the most important ingredient before anything else. 
3.1.1 Hacker’s perspective 
So what kind of techniques do the social engineers with a hacker background 
use? There are several ways to find information online and I will list some of the 
ones I have used the most here. First and foremost are not surprisingly Google 
and all the other search engines. If you know your target’s full name you have 
already got a pretty good start. Oftentimes you can find the target’s Facebook 
page or other online handles among the first search results. In case you have a 
picture you are doxing there is also a nice little-known function called reverse 
image search. With it you can use Google’s search engine to look for pages that 
host the picture in question. They even list the Instagram profiles that have been 
set public. If you are using Google Chrome you can just right-click and you will 
find the option to search for the image online in the menu that opens up. Other-
wise you can just drag the image to Google’s search bar. Below is an example of 
John Nunemaker’s profile photo from his Twitter account that has been run 
through Google Reverse Image search. 
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Picture 1. John Nunemaker's picture in Google Reverse image search. 
Bing offers the same kind of functionality as well these days and several other 
options are available too. One of the oldest independent search engines focused 
mainly on reverse image searching is called Tineye. Additionally another good 
option is Image Raider that scrapes Google, Bing and Yandex and lists the results 
in one place. 
Besides the regular search engines a good social engineer does not limit them-
selves at those. Some Facebook profiles are set to be not indexed in any search 
engine but you might find them in Facebook’s own search function (Facebook 
2016). This is true for other social media accounts the targets might be using like 
Twitter and Instagram. Usually the information accumulates little by little, you 
might find the person’s real name in their Facebook and with some googling 
comes up their Twitter account that lists one of their other online handles. Most 
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of the time this is the way the process works but every once in a while you might 
get even luckier. 
There are few search engines that are made especially for looking up people 
online and one the best ones right now is pipl. Say I am still looking up John 
Nunemaker, who is a known Core Application Engineer at Github and I have 
found his Github page linked on his Twitter account. On his page his username 
is listed as jnunemaker. A quick pipl search reveals all the following about him 
and more. Not visible in the picture are all of the accounts that pipl could find in 
the Internet that seem to belong to him. It should be taken into account that Nun-
emaker is a very well-known programmer so the amount of results correlate ap-
propriately. Pipl usually works well with people who have a large digital footprint 
but I have to admit I did not anticipate his home address to be among the results. 
Of course the results are only as accurate as the information posted online. The 
address listed in the results might be an old one or just completely wrong so 
oftentimes it is smart to check the results from several sources if possible. Pipl 
indexes several different social media websites such as LinkedIn, Twitter, Flickr, 
Facebook, Pinterest and many more and is an excellent way to find more ac-
counts and usernames for the target. 
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Picture 2. John Nunemaker's handle in pipl search. 
Lastly one good resource of information is a whois search. If the target has a 
website or domain registered under their name, there is a chance you will find 
more about them in the domain’s whois records kept by ICANN. The following 
considerably censored screenshot is the whois records of a well-known Finnish 
blogger’s website. In the records there are clearly visible the name, home address 
and even the phone number. The bigger websites and domains usually have 
something else in their records in place of the registrant’s name like simply admin 
and the address is the company’s own address. Several smaller website owners 
though use their own information when registering the domain. Oftentimes even 
if you are submitting fake information when registering a domain your billing in-
formation might be used in place of the phony contact details. Most registrars 
however do offer a service in which their information is used instead of regis-
20 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Mika Kontio 
trant’s, for a price of course (Ars Technica 2015.) Changing the information after-
wards might be too late since the information is already indexed and can be found 
in several caching services of the Internet like the Internet Archive’s Wayback 
Machine. 
 
Picture 3. Whois records of a well-known Finnish blogger. 
There are many other ways to find information about people and organizations 
online but were I to list them all here, this paper would be considerably longer. 
These are the most common ones that everyone can easily check themselves 
and see how much information they are leaking online. 
3.2 Developing a Relationship 
After the attacker has learned everything they can about the target, their next step 
is all about creating a relationship with the target. The relationship does not even 
have to be a positive one if it achieves the original goal of the attacker. The more 
the attacker knows about the target the easier it is to manipulate the target and 
gain their trust. Generally speaking there are 6-8 different commonly used princi-
ples that can be used to influence other people (Social Engineer Inc. 2016b.) In 
the following chapters I will go through the six rules of influence according to 
Robert Cialdini (2001, 10) and give examples on how they can be used in social 
engineering. 
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3.3 Social Proof 
Social Proof is perhaps the simplest and most widely used ones of the six princi-
ples of influence. At its simplest it just means information, opinions and behavior 
received from other people (Richardson 2014, 214). One amusing example is an 
old and famous video experiment from Candid Camera Inc. in which at first one 
actor and later on several are placed inside an elevator. The victim of this prank 
demonstrates our innate need to belong in a group as he walks in the elevator 
and mimics the behavior of the other people in the elevator by facing the same 
direction as they are or taking off his hat off just like everyone else present in the 
same space (Prudential – Bring Your Challenges 2013.) Humans still possess a 
herd mentality to some extent and when everyone else in the elevator is facing 
the opposite way as you are, you will naturally start feeling awkward or uncom-
fortable. This is also known as peer pressure. 
Social proof is a well-known phenomenon in the marketing world and it has been 
used for a long time. There are different ways to utilize it of course but in an article 
in Techcrunch there are listed five different ways social proof is used: expert so-
cial proof, celebrity social proof, user social proof, wisdom of the crowds social 
proof and wisdom of the your friends social proof (Lee 2011.) The last two use 
exactly the aforementioned group mentality: if your friends or the majority in your 
hometown are buying their cars from a certain place, you are more than likely to 
buy yours from the same store as well. The user social proof is a bit more obscure 
and it means the marketing leans on positive user experiences. This is also partly 
the principle network marketing is built on. When you are introduced to a new 
product by an ordinary person who does not have background in marketing you 
are more likely to trust their own experiences of the product than as opposed to 
seeing an ad in TV in which a well-groomed and good-looking person introduces 
you to the same product. Another good contemporary examples of this are the 
Youtube videos in which a regular content producer promotes a certain game or 
product for example. The first two – expert social proof and celebrity proof – are 
ones that use the human trait of being responsive to assertions of authority to 
their advantage. 
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3.4 Authority 
Using authority in social engineering feels almost like cheating because of how 
easy it is. Regent’s Professor Emeritus of Psychology and Marketing Robert 
Cialdini writes in his book Influence (2001, 185) about authority the following: 
“After all, as Milgram suggests, conforming to the dictates of authority figures has 
always had genuine practical advantages for us. Early on, these people (parents, 
teachers) knew more than we did, and we found that taking their advice proved 
beneficial—partly because of their greater wisdom and partly because they con-
trolled our rewards and punishments.” He also goes on to address the structure 
of our society as a whole that teaches us that following the proper authorities 
such as the police, political decision-makers and government is the right thing to 
do. Religions play their part as well in reinforcing the idea of following authorities. 
The idea of how authorities should always be followed is in fact so deeply rooted 
that we associate everything anti-authoritarian with negative feelings and ideas 
so one could argue authority is one highly refined aspect of social proof.  
3.5 Reciprocity 
Another important principle when influencing other people is reciprocity, which in 
this case means that people have a built-in need to return a favor. Oftentimes the 
favor is returned unconsciously. In his book, Social Engineering: The Art of Hu-
man Hacking, Christopher Hadnagy mentions that pharmaceutical companies 
spend over $10,000 on a single doctor with gifts that range from dinners and 
books to clothing and even computers. This way the companies wish to influence 
the doctors’ decision making when subscribing drugs to their patients (Hadnagy 
2010, 188.) I can personally confirm this as two of my friends are studying right 
now in Turku University Faculty of Medicine and they both received their first gifts, 
brand new stethoscopes that apparently cost over €100 a piece, already during 
their first week. Another friend of mine has a father who works as an MD and he 
showed me once a computer mouse he had received from Pfizer. It had blue 
liquid inside a transparent compartment as well as two Viagra pills floating 
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around. The monetary value of this gift is likely to be close to nothing, but its 
purpose of sitting on the doctor’s desk every day reminding him of this pharma-
ceutical company is a brilliant way of subtly influencing his thoughts. 
The gift the social engineer gives to his victim does not even have to be anything 
physical. Even a compliment or a pat on the back might be enough. In fact those 
are social engineering in their own right when received for a job well done. They 
encourage the employee to keep up the good work and produce more results of 
similar or even greater level and this way pay back the favor. The same goes for 
the attacker. It is oftentimes more profitable to give a few compliments to the 
secretary replying to your phone call or for example to bring two cups of coffee 
when entering a lobby. One for you and one for the co-worker who “had called 
sick and could not meet you this morning”. Perhaps the kind receptionist would 
like the extra $4.95 Mocha Frappuccino you have? Combine this with a friendly 
smile and few sympathizing comments about the drafty lobby and you already 
have a great start. However, here is where a good doxing effort really pays off: 
the receptionist might not even like coffee and only drinks tea. This is why finding 
information about the targets beforehand is invaluable. 
3.6 Liking 
Liking is the fourth principle we are discussing. It goes without saying you are 
more likely to respond better to a request from a person that you already like. 
Liking is also the second principle of network marketing. If you know the person 
who is trying to sell you a new household device you are far more likely to actually 
buy it than in a situation where the seller is an unknown person. Liking someone 
can rarely be faked and this is why it is perhaps the hardest principle to master. 
A lot of this part of social engineering comes down to the attacker being actually 
interested in their targets besides just presenting themselves as easily likable 
(Hadnagy 2011, 207.)  There are also ways to make people like you more such 
as positive reinforcement. This means for example starting a conversation by 
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complimenting the perfume the receptionist is wearing and asking its name be-
cause you want to buy it for your girlfriend (Hadnagy 2011, 209.) People love 
talking about themselves as I noticed in my brief visit to the telemarketing world. 
When dealing with people you need to have the patience for it. It is always ben-
eficial to be interested in the target and ask questions about the things they care 
about. 
Compliments and interest are good tools both, but an experienced social engi-
neer does not overuse neither. The overuse of positive reinforcement is referred 
to as satiation. Essentially it means that after a time all incentives lose their effect 
if used too many times or in too big portions. Compliments do not work if you use 
them repeatedly or give too many inside a too short timeframe (University of Min-
nesota 2016.) Instead of making the target like you more, they make the situation 
awkward and the attacker loses the potential advantage they might have had. 
Lastly there are of course the good looks. In a study published in the Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology it was discovered that people are more in-
clined to believe a person that they perceive as attractive possesses even more 
good social traits not visible from the outside (Dion etc. 1972, 288). Again it 
should be noted that what people perceive as desirable varies greatly. Besides 
their personal taste other factors affect this as well like the environment they are 
currently in. It is more than likely that if you are not outright denied a loan you are 
applying for in a bank, you are at least likely to be considerably delayed if you are 
not dressed properly when first meeting with your loan officer. Preparation for the 
interaction with the target never goes to waste. What passes as a smart outfit in 
a bank might make you seem out of place in a metal concert. When interacting 
with a person it is also useful to know something about their personal taste, do 
they like people dressed in suits or leather jackets and so on. Regardless of how 
you are preparing yourself the effort will always to pay off to some extent if it is 
clear you have spent time honing your attire. 
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3.7 Commitment and Consistency 
The fifth principle of influencing other people is commitment and consistency. 
When working as a telemarketer I would always start the phone call by making 
sure the callee answered two times “yes” to my questions. The way the human 
mind works is that it tries to be consistent with the previously taken actions. When 
you have already answered in the affirmative twice it is easy to keep on going. 
The next question in the call would be something like “Wow, you sure are paying 
a lot for electricity right now! It would be great if the prices were lower for you, 
right?” What happens is the callee starts making small commitments of agreeing 
with you about things that seem insignificant. Little by little the level of commit-
ment is raised until the actual product is sold to the customer. In the end some of 
the most easily persuaded customers practically sold the contract to themselves. 
People want to be consistent and they appreciate consistency in others as well. 
Consistency and commitment go well in hand-to-hand because people do not 
want to take back the commitments they have already made (Hadnagy 2014, 
202.) A good example of this are Internet penny auctions and to an extent auc-
tions in general. Oftentimes the product on sale starts with a meager price that is 
only a fraction of its original worth and people viewing it will think that this here is 
a real bargain and bid on it. After a while someone else, who has had the same 
idea outbids them and the cycle goes on because people still perceive the product 
as a low hanging fruit and continue bidding on it. The fact that someone else is 
bidding on it is barely a nuisance. In reality the price of the product is actually way 
higher because every time someone bids on it they pay a small fee for the right 
to bid in addition to their actual bid on the product. 
The way a social engineer works with consistency and commitment is subtle. It 
is no use asking for the real goal right away in the beginning of the conversation, 
no one is going to give you their account password after you have barely intro-
duced yourself. Instead when manipulating people into keeping their commit-
ments a good social engineer starts small and gets the snowball rolling (Hadnagy 
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2014, 204.) When addressing the person responsible for managing accounts in-
side a company a good start could be for example “Hey, are you the password 
guy?” This gives already the impression that you might not be that well knowl-
edgeable about computers and puts the target in their customer service mode 
when they reply. Or you could assert your authority by starting with “Hey, you’re 
John, right? You’re responsible for the HR department’s account management, 
right?” Depending on the target both or neither might work, it all depends on the 
person. One might not respond well to explaining anything IT related to anyone 
not familiar with the field whereas someone else might have trouble responding 
well to any kind of authority. Once again the more you know of the target the 
easier any kind of influencing or manipulating is. 
3.8 Scarcity 
The last principle of influencing people is scarcity. Scarcity in the context of social 
engineering means that people desire anything that is rare or scarce like a lower 
prices for clothes during the Christmas holidays. Humans have the peculiar way 
of valuing everything that is rare and divergent. A faulty stamp or coin is valued 
way higher than a good one. The same goes with opportunities, the rarer they 
are the more attractive they seem (Cialdini 2001, 204-205.) Scarcity is a tool to 
create urgency and desire in people’s minds and it works miracles along with the 
other principles of influencing people. 
From the social engineer’s point of view scarcity is an excellent tool to create 
artificial time constraints for the target. If for example you are looking to get inside 
the server room it might help your cause even further to stress that you have 
come to solve a server problem that is causing downtime for all of the company’s 
customers. The person with the key to the room gets straight away a nasty time 
constraint, he could try verifying the story with someone else and risk the com-
pany losing money over downtime or just let you in straight away. If the person is 
not trained for these occasions they might be more than inclined to choose the 
latter. 
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4 INDIRECT ATTACKS 
Social engineering is not limited to just physical interaction between the attacker 
and the victim. There are several ways it is utilized without the attacker ever being 
in the same room with the victim. In this chapter I will go through most of the 
common indirect approaches used in SE attacks. The way these attacks work is 
that they once again abuse some of the basic human traits such as curiosity. 
4.1 Phishing and Spear Phishing 
Phishing in general means an attempt to trick the target into sharing sensitive 
information with the attacker. Typically phishing attacks are carried out with email 
but they are not limited to using it alone. Most of the phishing attacks can classi-
fied as mass attacks, which means their target group is large and the content of 
the phishing attempt does not contain any specific details tailored for each recip-
ient (Ramzan 2010.) Spear phishing means that the content of the message is at 
least to some extent tailored for the recipient (Hoffman 2013). As a part of this 
thesis I carried out a spear phishing experiment at Phirelight Inc. with the goal of 
finding out how well the employees were trained against such attacks. The results 
and how I executed the attack are outlined in chapters 6 and 7. 
Phishing mass attacks are crafted in a way that they reach as much audience as 
possible while seeming as little out of place as possible. The end goal most of 
the time is acquiring the targets’ accounts or for example their credit card num-
bers. The phishing email seems to originate from a source that the most of the 
recipients trust like eBay administrator. The nets cast by the phisher are often so 
wide that the attempt is easy to spot: if the target has no account in eBay yet 
receives an email from them they are less likely to even open it (Hoffman 2013.) 
Another good example of this are the phishing emails that have very bad gram-
mar in them or have clearly been run through Google Translate. 
Spear phishing is basically phishing on steroids. If the attacker knows their target 
and has collected a good amount of information about them, it is significantly 
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more probable that they will actually get the target to open the email. According 
to a study carried out by Cisco (2011, 5) the average chance of a person opening 
a phishing email that is part of a mass attack is a meager 3% whereas a targeted 
spear phishing email is opened in around 70% of the cases. It is common to 
combine spear phishing attacks with zero-day exploits that lie in wait behind the 
innocuous looking link in the email from the supposed CEO of the company. At-
tachments can also be used. In 2015 Symantec identified a new Trojan called 
Laziok, which was used for reconnaissance inside the corporate intranet so the 
attackers would gain a better understanding of the infected network. And how did 
the Trojan get into the corporate network? The exploit itself used a well-known 
vulnerability in Microsoft ActiveX and the Trojan was packed inside a regular look-
ing Excel file that arrived as an attachment of a spam email. The exploit in ques-
tion was not a zero-day but since the successfully exploited systems had not been 
properly patched it worked nonetheless (Symantec 2015.) 
4.2 Baiting 
Whereas phishing is focused on finding out sensitive information about the target, 
baiting could be called its physical counterpart. The goal is to gain information 
and assets from the target by infiltrating the target with for example an infected 
USB flash drive or a CD (Kovacs 2015). Baiting does not have to target just one 
person as pretty much anyone visiting the corporate parking lot could spot the 
lonely flash drive with company logo on it laying on the ground. Not many people 
would just ignore the flash drive and would at least return it to the lobby of the 
company. The USB stick and CD are just examples, however, and in reality the 
only limit is the imagination of the attacker. The attacker could for example deliver 
a new keyboard with embedded malicious commands to the newest intern of the 
company. 
In a Trustwave SpiderLabs blogpost Wendel Guglielmetti Henrique (2013) de-
scribes the methods their company has used when auditing their customers’ ca-
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pability to respond to baiting attacks. They would start by sending packages con-
taining either a CD-ROM or a USB pen-drive to all the employees. Later on they 
would email the employees impersonating employees from another department 
of the company and ask the target employees to install the new Anti-virus soft-
ware in the packages. From 15 packages sent 1 resulted in a success. In a couple 
of other exercises they dropped USB pen-drives around the company, which re-
sulted in a better success as one of them was opened by a person working as 
one of the physical security staff. Just by this person inserting the drive into a 
computer they were able to obtain the company Wi-Fi pre-shared key (Henrique 
2013.) Baiting and phishing are both techniques that exploit people’s curiosity in 
new situations. 
4.3 Watering Hole 
Watering hole is the next in the line of indirect ways of attacking a target. In a 
watering hole attack the attacker initiates the attack against the target by first 
compromising a legit website for example and patiently waits until the target or 
someone affiliated with the target visits the site (Abendan 2013). This is precisely 
the reason why it is always a risky decision to use third-party hosted code on your 
own website. Even though your own website might be secure the chain is again 
only as strong as its weakest link. Another good example of watering hole attacks 
is malvertising. 
Malvertising or malicious advertising means an online ad that is infected with mal-
ware or a malicious link. Malvertising is a huge business and its benefits for the 
attacker are numerous. In the summer of 2015 Malwarebytes uncovered a large 
scale attack that was using Yahoo!’s own ad network to its advantage. Based on 
the numbers from SimilarWeb in December 2015 Yahoo!’s website got over 4.7 
billion visits from the ads. At the time of the attack Yahoo! had over 6.9 billion hits 
a month so the volume of people reached this way was huge (Segura 2015; Sim-
ilarWeb 2016.) 
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4.4 Identity Thefts and Impersonation 
Identity theft is not an attack technique per-se but it is what some social engineer-
ing attacks eventually lead to. Previously we have discussed using the target’s 
personal information in gaining their trust and/or abusing it. However, if enough 
information is amassed nothing prevents the attacker from actually assuming the 
whole identity of the target. The more information the attacker has of the target 
the easier it just gets. The amount of information required for getting an instant 
loan for example is alarmingly small. Just the home address and SSN might be 
enough. According to Chicago Tribune (Coen, 2009) a contract worker hired by 
AT&T managed to steal personal data from 2,100 company employees and cash 
in over $70,000 in loans. In another article published by Reuters a thief managed 
to purchase $1,357 worth of electronics from Apple’s web-store. This was 
achieved with stolen information as well but what makes the case stand out is the 
fact that the victim knew her identity had been stolen two years earlier (Lipka 
2013.) You can move and change your address but once someone gets a hold 
of your SSN it is a whole another story. The amount of damage that can be done 
with your personal information is often overlooked by authorities and in Finland 
the identity theft itself was not even a crime until September 2015 (YLE 2015). 
4.5 Tailgating 
Tailgating simply means the act where an unauthorized person follows someone 
authorized inside somewhere they should not be able to get. Tailgating is not 
solely limited to the physical reality but it is more commonplace in person. The 
attacker might be having a cigarette outside the backdoor, dressed in office attire 
without any outer jacket and in a big company it is just natural that you do not 
know everyone working there. Again the worst enemy of security is the human 
nature. Some employees might not let the stranger pass but others might and 
there is nothing to stop the attacker from trying again with different people (Page 
2004, 5-6.) Just like all the other attack techniques this one can be combined 
nicely with several of the other techniques. The attacker might be dressed for 
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example as a police officer and assert their authority over the employee outside 
the locked door. Best practice against tailgating is making sure that the employ-
ees are trained for it. All visitors should be escorted and secured areas should be 
locked at all times. One option is to use revolving doors and man-traps as well so 
that the employees cannot let even by accident anyone else through at the same 
time. Lastly you should have multiple checkpoints. The attacker might get lucky 
once but his chances drop already at the next checkpoint. Often it is said that 
people should carry their badges on them at all times while in reality it is a really 
bad idea. The badges should be worn only inside the office. Today it is not an 
impossible task at all to take a photo of the ID hanging of your neck when you are 
enjoying your morning coffee at the café and the image can be used with a very 
little effort to manufacture a counterfeit ID for the attacker (Page 2004, 6; Mr. 
Ford's Class 2014.) 
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5 CASE STUDIES 
So far we have only discussed the attack methods themselves and now it is time 
to see where they can lead. I have picked the following cases of social engineer-
ing because of how well they are documented and how they illustrate the various 
dangers of for example leaving too much of your personal information online. 
5.1 Ars Technica Reporter and GoDaddy 
Naoki Hiroshima is a reporter working at Ars Technica. He is also the owner of 
the Twitter handle @N, which among all of the other short or easily remembered 
Twitter handles are very attractive targets for all hackers looking to gain some 
fame. Twitter handle hijacking has been going on for years and is a fairly lucrative 
business. The stolen handles are often sold and they fetch high prices. Hiroshima 
had earlier received offers for the handle and even ones as high as $50,000.  
Naoki’s handle was accessed by indirect means which in turn exposed the lax 
security of GoDaddy’s support phone (Hiroshima 2014; Smith 2012.) Another 
reason why this case is important is that it outlines very well how personal infor-
mation alone can be used in SE attacks with little or no help from actual hacking. 
5.1.1 The Attack 
The first sign of the attack Hiroshima received was when he received a text mes-
sage from PayPal for a one-time validation code. Shortly after ignoring the text 
message, as he had grown accustomed to people attacking his accounts, he re-
ceived an email from GoDaddy that explained his account settings had been 
modified successfully. Hiroshima could not log back in GoDaddy and had to call 
them to resolve the issue. Unfortunately the attacker had already changed all the 
information associated with the account so he had no way of proving he was the 
original owner of the account. Hiroshima filed a case report for his account on 
GoDaddy’s website but was told the response could take as much as 48 hours. 
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Soon after he received an anonymous tip from someone in Facebook that he 
should change his Twitter email address. Hiroshima’s current email address, 
which was also the one linked to his Twitter account at the time, was under his 
own domain that now had been hijacked. The tip turned out to be a good one 
since shortly after the attacker opened a ticket at Twitter’s Zendesk asking for a 
manual reset of the Twitter password (Hiroshima 2014.) 
Twitter wanted to have more information though and the attacker discontinued 
this course of action. Instead they started to bargain with Hiroshima, they would 
give the domain back in exchange for the Twitter handle. GoDaddy’s response 
for his claim earlier turned out to be of little help since they refused any help as 
Hiroshima was not anymore the registrant of the domain name. Hiroshima had 
no other choice but to give in to the attacker’s extortion and after handing them 
over his Twitter handle he regained the control of his domain and email (Hiro-
shima 2014.) 
5.1.2 How did it happen? 
In this case the attacker was kind enough to gloat over his victory and actually 
offered to explain to Hiroshima how exactly they had managed to obtain his do-
main. At first the attacker had called PayPal and obtained the last four numbers 
of Hiroshima’s credit card. According to an article published in Wired (Honan 
2014) PayPal did not release this information though. This is hard to prove though 
and I would not take just the company’s word for it especially since the attacker 
is not available for interview. Regardless those last numbers could have been 
obtained in other ways as well. One of the more physical ways of finding infor-
mation about SE targets is called dumpster diving, which is precisely what it 
sounds like. Granted it can mean finding information about the target without ac-
tually diving into their garbage but that is one solid way of finding really sensitive 
personal information (Techopedia 2016b.) Oftentimes people overlook how smart 
it actually is to throw into the trash your bills or other documents that give away 
details about you. Even throwing away old CDs, DVDs or USB sticks is risky since 
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information can be recovered from them to an extent even if the files themselves 
have been deleted. 
After obtaining the last four numbers of Hiroshima’s credit card the attacker called 
GoDaddy and explained they had lost the card but could remember the last four 
numbers. The GoDaddy support staff actually let the attacker guess the first two 
digits of the credit card and even went as far as letting them guess from a range 
of numbers. This is even more dubious practice since several credit cards have 
easily guessed first numbers, for example Visa cards always start with a 4 (How 
Stuff Works? 2016). The attacker also explained that usually he has to keep 
guessing longer but this time he got it at first try (Hiroshima 2014.) It goes without 
saying that this should not have happened at all in the first place and the fault is 
entirely on PayPal and GoDaddy. The case shows very well that even a small bit 
of information in the wrong hand can lead to unexpected results. The attacker’s 
path from PayPal to GoDaddy is also typical in all hacking and SE attacks. It is 
common to go after other parties first to find more information about the target or 
to gain sort of a foothold when attacking the real target. 
5.1.3 Things Learned 
Previously in this paper I briefly mentioned Steam’s information leak in Decem-
ber. Among the information leaked were the last two numbers of the credit cards 
of some of the users. The case of Naoki Hiroshima and GoDaddy clearly shows 
that information alone can be used as a weapon in SE attacks. In Naoki’s case 
he had previously used his Google Apps email address under his own domain 
which in turn gave the attacker the opportunity to take over his Facebook as well. 
The damage done was fairly limited but since Google Apps email can be used in 
various websites to log in, it might be an unnecessary risk to take. In case the 
domain gets hacked like in Naoki’s case the email can be used to access way 
too many other places. Gmail in this regard would have been the safer option. 
Hiroshima made a mistake in using the same email in several other important 
places to him but he could not have influenced the way GoDaddy and PayPal 
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handled the situation. PayPal does offer the option to not disclose any information 
over the phone but I had not even heard of this before reading about it in Naoki’s 
own article. GoDaddy’s actions went just to show how badly they were prepared 
against social engineering and giving away freely any sensitive information from 
their customers is just inexcusable (Hiroshima 2014.) If anything should be 
learned from this, it is the same lesson my father taught me about driving a car: 
“Always assume the other people in their cars are complete idiots.” 
5.2 Aaron Barr vs Anonymous 
Social engineering techniques are not always the methods that start the attack. 
Sometimes they are used in conjunction with regular hacking techniques like in 
the case of Aaron Bar. Aaron Barr was the CEO of a technology security company 
called HBGary Federal. In 2011 Barr had set his sights on the hacking collective 
Anonymous and wanted to expose their key figures and their real identities. The 
case is interesting because Barr himself used social engineering techniques to 
find out information about the Anonymous but in the end he became the victim of 
the real engineering. Barr infiltrated the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels the 
Anonymous were using and allegedly managed to identify three people who he 
claimed were the so called ring leaders. After releasing their identities, however, 
the company became a target of a DDoS attack and their internal systems were 
breached and their emails leaked. This analysis is based largely on the article 
published in Ars Technica about the incident and the information they had was 
extracted from the emails released in the aftermath of the attack (Anderson, 
2011.) 
5.2.1 The Attack 
First sign of the malign intent was the DDoS on February the 5th. Barr responded 
by promising to take the gloves off. He went on to promise to release more details 
on the members of the Anonymou that were already arrested. However, on the 
very next day HBGary Federal’s website was taken down and defaced with a 
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message from the Anonymous. They managed to access HBGary Federal’s 
email server, which Barr administrated and released over 40,000 emails for eve-
ryone to see on the Pirate Bay. Some members of the Anonymous reportedly 
bragged how they had deleted over 1TB of HBGary backup data as well as wiped 
Barr’s iPad remotely (Anderson, 2011.) 
5.2.2 How did it happen? 
The initial DDoS took only little part in actually bringing down the HBGary Fed-
eral’s website. It acted more as a declaration of war than means to an end. The 
real attack began on right on the website itself (Bright 2011.) 
HBGary Federal’s website was using for reasons unknown a Content Manage-
ment System (CMS) custom built just for it. This CMS was poorly designed and 
had numerous flaws in it. The biggest of them was an incorrectly filtered PHP 
parameter that made a regular SQL injection attack possible. The attackers 
gained access to the database running on the site and accessed the user part of 
it. Passwords are often stored as hashes that are computed from the actual pass-
word through various mathematical functions and the idea is that they are not 
reversible. The process does, however, always lead to the same hash when the 
same string is hashed. There are various databases freely available in the Inter-
net that have a look up function for already calculated hashes, which makes find-
ing a match almost an instant process for an unsalted hash. This is why before 
hashing the passwords are usually salted first. This means that another string is 
added to them so if anyone else would hash just the password, they would not 
get the same result. Another method of increasing the security is iterative hashing 
which means basically just hashing the hash all over again several times, some-
times even thousands of times. The HBGary Federal website database stored all 
of the accounts in MD5 hashes but as an oversight they were not in any way 
salted or iteratively hashed and thus were easy targets. The attackers managed 
to crack both the CEO’s and COO’s password that were both only six characters 
long and had only two numbers in them. (Bright 2011; Defuse Security 2014.) 
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After cracking the passwords the attackers quickly started to test what they could 
access with them. HBGary Federal’s server had also a Secure Shell (SSH) ac-
cess and as luck would have it the COO had the same password on his SSH 
account as he did on his email account. The first stop sign for the attackers arose 
when they found out the COO was only a regular user and lacked any root-privi-
leges. Luck was however still on their side as the server they were accessing was 
running a vulnerable version of GNU C Library that allowed them to escalate their 
privileges to the root level. With the root access the attackers found and purged 
the HBGary Federal backup data from the server. Barr’s password, however, 
gave the attackers even more. HBGary Federal were using Google Apps email 
so the password gave access to the whole company email service, which Barr 
administrated. It also allowed access to Greg Hoglund’s mail. Greg was the orig-
inal founder and CEO of the HBGary parent company. This is where the social 
engineering part of the attack started (Bright 2011.) 
Greg was running another website called rootkit.com and in his email the attack-
ers found out that the root password for the server running the website was either 
“88j4bb3rw0cky88” or “88Scr3am3r88”. As a security practice a root access was 
not allowed through SSH so they needed a regular account on the system. They 
contacted the admin of the server from Greg’s own email address and made up 
a story of being abroad and unable to login to Greg’s account on the server. To 
support their story they casually mentioned the root password in the discussion, 
which was a clever way of using social proof to convince the admin. The email 
came from the customer’s email address and it referenced the root password so 
it must be the customer speaking, right? I have included most of the discussion 
in a separate appendix and it illustrates better itself how easily the attacker actu-
ally managed to gain root access to the server than I can describe myself. The 
conversation was linked in the Ars Technica article but other than that I cannot 
verify if its origins so it should be taken with some grain of salt (Bright 2011; 
Pastebin 2011.) 
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5.2.3 Things Learned 
In the defense of the rootkit.com administrator it has to be said that he fell a victim 
to a really good SE attack. In his position not many things could have been done 
differently with the practices they already had in place. Instead the practices 
should have been planned from the start differently in a way that no one could 
access their sensitive information just by emailing someone. The same kind of a 
practice would not stand at all in any bigger organization. As reported by Ars 
Technica (Brodkin 2012) Amazon only recently updated its security policy that 
allowed anyone calling them to find out the last four numbers of the credit card 
linked to the account. Security practices were in place, like only being able to 
view the last four numbers of the credit card but like in many other cases it was 
underestimated how much damage could be caused with the information pro-
vided. The problem when auditing any security system is that the auditor is often 
constrained by a time limit whereas the real attacker has all the time in the world. 
There have also been cases where the attacker has been actually an ex-em-
ployee from the IT department who has left himself a backdoor or credentials into 
the system. It is not likely that he is suspected at all especially if it has been years 
since he has worked in the company. 
The original culprit of the whole ordeal was without doubt the faulty CMS. There 
is a lot of debate in the Internet over whether or not you should use your custom-
built CMS or be satisfied with the already existing ones. Both have their pros and 
cons but one of the worst cons of having a custom CMS is that its security is only 
as competent as its developers. It is true the already existing CMSs are not void 
of vulnerabilities but their strength is that there is a solid developer base updating 
their code all the time. On the other hand open-source CMSs fall prey to vulner-
abilities that affect all sites running them whereas custom CMSs have their unique 
vulnerabilities but their maintenance is also more expensive. Oftentimes the ad-
vocates of custom CMSs are themselves web development companies and the 
ones speaking on behalf of the open-source or proprietary CMSs are people that 
are already using them (Davis 2015; Edwards 2012; Finn 2014; JBSystems 2013; 
NewSprout 2016.) 
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Regardless of the choice the system should have been audited. In the end social 
engineering played only a small part in a chain of unfortunate events that could 
have been avoided if the CMS had been actually reviewed by professional pen-
etration testers. Just like was the case with the hacking of Naoki Hiroshima’s Go-
Daddy domain, the less trust you put in different components of your system the 
more secure you will be in the end. 
5.3 Blackout in Ukraine 
Social engineering techniques should never be underestimated. This became es-
pecially clear on December 23rd 2015 in a western Ukraine city called Ivano-
Frankivsk when the lights started going out. A month earlier the power went out 
on the Crimean peninsula when someone armed with explosives destroyed the 
powerlines to Crimea. This time, however, no explosives were used. Instead sev-
eral power stations were hacked and disabled leaving hundreds of thousands 
without electricity. At the time of writing this thesis the situation is still ongoing 
and on January 20th researchers from the antivirus company ESET uncovered a 
new wave of attacks that targeted Ukrainian electricity distribution companies 
(Goodin 2016; Lipovsky 2016a.) 
5.3.1 The Attack 
The attack comprised of at least three different parts. Ukrainian electricity com-
pany Kyivoenergo reported that there had been an intrusion to their systems that 
disconnected in total 30 of their substations which lead to a power outage to over 
80,000 customers. The power outage lasted around three hours before the utility 
staff restored the system into a so called “manual mode”. In total the outage 
lasted around six hours before all parts of the system could be brought back 
online. 
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5.3.2 How did it happen? 
The whole attack started with spear phishing. The attackers sent several emails 
that appeared to be coming from the Ukrainian parliament, Rada. The content 
varied but the intent was to get the recipients to open the document included in 
the email. In the documents there were just a couple of pictures that looked like 
error messages that were intended to trick the user to enable document macros. 
The macro was the attacker’s real way into the system as it downloaded Black-
Energy Lite Trojan that eventually took control of the system. Below is a sample 
of one of the emails used in the attacks. In the email the sender pretends that the 
President of Ukraine has decreed a partial mobilization and all organizations re-
ceiving the email should submit a list of employees with the included attachment 
for mobilization purposes (Lipovsky 2016b; CyS Centrum 2016.) 
 
Picture 4. A screenshot of one of the Ukrainian phishing emails (CyS Centrum 
2016). 
The content of the email and the sender address were a very clever way of gain-
ing the trust of the recipients when you consider the current political climate in 
Ukraine and Crimea. 
BlackEnergy is a very destructive modular Trojan, meaning it can download more 
components once it is already in the system depending on what it is used for. In 
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the power company attack it downloaded Win32/KillDisk malware that is used for 
making the system unbootable. The KillDisk was also responsible for terminating 
the process used in the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and overwriting the ex-
ecutable file running it with random data thus making recovery even harder. It is 
still unclear whether or not BlackEnergy itself caused the actual power outage by 
opening the breakers in the substations or if this was caused directly by the at-
tackers through an SSH backdoor that was discovered in the beginning of Janu-
ary (Lipovsky 2016b; Cherepanov 2016; Lee 2016.) The same Trojan was previ-
ously detected in various systems in US facilities in 2014 but at the time it did not 
succeed in damaging any systems (BBC 2016). On January 20th a new wave of 
attacks were observed with the same kind of attachments in the emails, but this 
time BlackEnergy was not the final payload but instead a modified version of the 
open-source gcat backdoor, which can be used for downloading more executa-
bles and running shell commands (Lipovsky 2016a). 
5.3.3 Things Learned 
This is yet another prime example that shows how much damage spear phishing 
can cause at its worst. The case is also the first documented case of a blackout 
caused by hacking. It emphasizes very well the recent worries of several re-
searchers over having embedded systems accessible from the Internet (Goodin 
2016). The systems should be at least inaccessible from the machines that are 
accessible from the outside. Air gaps do not prevent all of the attacks as evi-
denced by Stuxnet that got into the Iranian systems via a USB stick, but they do 
increase the security considerably (Zetter 2014.) 
Regarding the spear phishing it is hard to say if it could have been prevented. I 
do not have access to the power companies’ or Ukrainian government’s usual 
protocols so it is possible that such an email could have been actually sent to the 
power companies from the parliament. It still should have been double-checked 
before any of the emails were opened. The best practice against these kinds of 
attacks are protocols that should always be followed. The spam filters and the 
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virus scans will not catch the malware embedded in the files all the time if they 
have been created especially for the target or just well encrypted. Furthermore 
even though the file contained a legit looking error report about macros, it would 
have revealed itself as a phony the minute someone actually looked at it any 
closer and noticed it was just an embedded picture. 
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6 PHIRELIGHT SPEARPHISHING EXPERIMENT 
The idea of the experiment came from the Phirelight Chief Technical Officer 
(CTO) Chris Dodunski last summer. At the time I was busy with other projects 
and could not devote any time to it but when I started writing this thesis it occurred 
to me that it would be a perfect fit for it. 
The idea was simple: I was to send an email to every Phirelight employee and 
pretend to be the CEO. In the emails there should an individual tracking pixel to 
see who has opened the email. The email also had to include a link that looked 
like it would lead to the real Phirelight webpage but instead lead to another do-
main where I had set up a simple login form to phish for user credentials. 
Originally I was going to write all of the code needed for tracking etc. myself but 
during the weekend before starting the project I happened to upgrade my distro 
of Kali Linux that had just received its first distro upgrade in 2016. Among the new 
things added in the upgrade was a program called the King Phisher. 
6.1 King Phisher 
King Phisher is a tool meant for simulating real world phishing attacks. It runs on 
most Linux platforms and comes pre-installed in the new Kali Linux 2016.1. King 
Phisher is developed mainly by three people, Brendan Geise or @coldfusion39, 
Jeff McCutchan or @jamcut and Spencer McIntyre or @zeroSteiner. Spencer 
was an invaluable help during my testing and his input and support in the official 
#king-phisher IRC channel in Freenode.org pretty much made it possible that I 
got the experiment working like I wanted (SecureState 2016a.) 
King Phisher is divided into two parts, the client and the server. The server is 
responsible for creating the phony webpage that the targets land on after follow-
ing the link in the email and it even supports running the server with Secure Sock-
ets Layer (SSL). The server component has its own integrated web server so no 
separate server is needed. The server can also serve as a Simple Mail Transfer 
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Protocol (SMTP) relay if need be and the emails can even be tunneled to it 
through SSH in case the ISP for example blocks the usual ports (SecureState 
2016b.) My server was running in an external Virtual Private Server (VPS). 
The client is responsible for crafting the actual phishing emails and it communi-
cates with the server through SSH. My client was running inside an Ubuntu 14.04 
Virtual Machine (VM). In the screenshot below is visible the login screen to the 
King Phisher server as well as the email crafting window under it. 
 
Picture 5. King Phisher Client Login screen and email crafting. 
The edit screen contains the actual message being sent in its HTML form. King 
Phisher comes with several pre-made emails for various test scenarios but in my 
phishing campaign I ended up creating my own which better suited my needs. 
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6.2 SMTP relay 
The key component needed for phishing campaign is obviously a mail server. At 
first I tried using the same server hosting King Phisher’s server component as an 
SMTP relay but the emails could not get through Google’s spam filter. When I 
tested with Microsoft’s email servers the messages went straight into the spam 
folder so I came to the conclusion that I had to use a proper email server to get 
around this problem. The reason I needed to have a working SMTP relay was 
because King Phisher identifies each recipient with a unique tag as well as the 
unique tracking pixel and these are created and embedded into the messages by 
the program itself. Otherwise I could have just crafted all the emails by hand but 
since I wanted to see some in-depth data in the results I chose to use King 
Phisher. 
There are many different options for an SMTP relay available and some are made 
especially for mailing a big number of people. One of the ones I looked into was 
called Mandrill but I could not find a straight answer whether or not the emails 
would or would not be tagged as spam by Google. I ended up purchasing a fake 
domain for the campaign and linked Google Apps for Work to it. The domain 
name I used looked like the real company domain, except it had switched places 
of the couple of letters in the name. This is one of the common techniques used 
in creating the fake domains. A few other tricks are adding letters that are located 
close to the real letters on the keyboard or replacing some letters with others that 
look like them when just glanced. 
Google Apps for Work gives you the option to use Gmail as your mail-client while 
still using your own domain in the email address and since all of the emails that 
originate from Google’s own servers are less likely to be flagged as spam it was 
a simple decision (Google 2016a.) Setting up the email was a relatively simple 
process. The address I created was obviously mimicking the real address of the 
Phirelight CEO but other than the address and profile picture I added, I really did 
not need anything else in it. The real trouble was setting up the SMTP. 
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The first step was to link my phony domain to the Google’s mail server. This was 
accomplished by adding the MX records to my domain’s DNS records. Addition-
ally I added one TXT record that served as a way to identify the domain to Google. 
The last thing I did was to create a Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record for 
the domain in a TXT record as well. The SPF record is one of frequently used 
methods to prevent spoofing the sender address and it basically allows the do-
main owner to specify which mail servers they are going to use (Mehnle 2010). 
Google Apps for Work does not have SMTP enabled by default and it is hidden 
behind countless other options that are accessible through the Google Admin 
panel. The first option under the SMTP relay service defines the allowed senders 
and it comes in when you are spoofing the SMTP headers in the crafted email. If 
it is set to “Only registered Apps users in my domains” it means you cannot spoof 
the SMTP email address as someone else’s email address. I found out this the 
hard way when I spent one whole day trying to figure why the SMTP relay was 
not accepting my spoofed emails. However, the SMTP option in question does 
not stop you from spoofing the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) 
email address which is the one you see in the “From:” field of any email you 
receive or send. Conflicting SMTP and MIME email addresses usually light up 
several warning lights and that is why in several of the real phishing attempts the 
MIME address is set to the same address as SMTP address even though it might 
mean that the sender’s displayed address is something like steve@applle.com 
(Google 2016b.) 
 
Picture 6. SMTP relay settings in Google Admin Panel. 
Other things I had to configure were allowed IP addresses, though this can be 
left to any IP address but it is not a very secure practice so it is not recommended, 
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SMTP authentication and Transport Layer Security (TLS). I chose to use just the 
common SSL through port 465 to the Gmail’s server and authenticate with the 
email credentials. 
6.3 The Email 
I was in a very lucky position when it came to creating the phishing email since I 
actually had some real emails that I could look at and mimic the style in them. In 
a real world scenario the attackers would seek to first acquire some kind of a 
template to use. For example an old business proposition email from the CEO or 
something like that would be a perfect start. I would not even rule out crafting a 
fake business proposition to the CEO just to see in the reply what his emails 
usually look like. Obviously I am not going to show in this thesis what the email 
exactly contained but the cherry on top of its icing was the spoofed link. Since the 
email was formatted in HTML I could insert a link that looked like just a regular 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) like http://www.example.com/login but in reality 
it was hidden under the HTML <a> href attribute. The real link in its HTML form 
was similar to <a href=http://www.fakedomain.com/login?id=abc>http://www.ex-
ample.com/login</a> meaning the receiver would only see supposed link in the 
email while the actual destination was elsewhere. In the actual link there was also 
a unique ID added by King Phisher to identify each person who had opened the 
link. Without the ID no one could not even see the pages behind the link as they 
would just display 404. Hiding the real URL behind the link is really often used in 
phishing emails and it is not easy to spot unless you are looking at your browser’s 
or email client’s bottom bar where the real URL shows up. Because I was spoof-
ing the MIME address the email appeared as if it came from the CEO’s address 
but anyone looking at the source code would have spotted that the real address 
was in the fake domain. 
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6.4 The Landing Page 
The second reason for this test, other than just checking how well the Phirelight 
employees were trained against it, was to see if this kind of a test could be offered 
as a service to the customers as well. For this reason we needed a good landing 
page for the link, something that would do the job of really measuring whether or 
not the employees would fall for phishing attempt while not being too complicated. 
I ended up using a simple login portal that would redirect the user to the legit 
company website. As per the Phirelight CTO’s request I crafted another landing 
page that warned the employees in case they had actually given their credentials 
away. All of the pages were created almost entirely in just plain HTML with the 
exception of one utility JavaScript (JS). The appearance of the landing page was 
mostly a placeholder for the internal test and will most likely be completely differ-
ent if this kind of a spear phishing test is turned into a product at Phirelight. Below 
is a sample screenshot of the landing page used in the test. 
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Picture 7. Screenshot of the landing page used in the test. 
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7 SUMMARY OF THE EXPERIMENT AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Before the actual test I did several tests with the Phirelight CTO to get the format-
ting of the email right and to test if it went into spam folder or not. During the 
preliminary testing we ran one quick test with one of the employees from sales 
department who will further on be referred as Fred. Fred went as far as to open 
the email and click the link in it. I heard from Chris that after that he had come in 
his office asking, and I quote, “What the hell is this?” This is the reaction everyone 
should have at least at this point. Though if the attacker had hidden a malicious 
JS on the page behind the link and not just a login form, Fred would have already 
lost. With the JS the attacker could have for example injected malicious iframes 
on top of legit ones on the other websites Fred visited even if he had seemingly 
closed the tab containing the JS. This is precisely why it is never a good idea to 
open a link in an email that you do not trust. 
7.1 The Results 
All in all the test surpassed my expectations. In total 23 employees and their 
emails were targeted and I had hoped to get one or two legit credentials. Instead 
I got 8. In the screenshot below you can see all the people who opened the email 
they received. Parts of the screenshot have been cropped because of the size 
limitations and identifying parts have been censored. All of the targeted employ-
ees except one opened the email they received. 
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Picture 8. People who opened the email they received. 
During the project my first test emails ended up in Gmail’s spam folder but later 
on they went straight to the inbox. The emails had at least two easily flagged 
features: the MIME address and the SMTP sender address did not match and 
the link in the email lead somewhere else than it seemed. I suspect I might have 
trained the spam detectors not to flag the emails because I kept tagging the 
emails as not spam. Were this really the case it would be somewhat worrying if 
this is the only way Google checks whether or not the emails are spam. After 
some post-testing research I did find a mention about Google’s spam filters that 
apply some kind of artificial neural network to figure out which of the emails are 
spam and which are not. To put it simply if a certain message or sender gets 
flagged by the users as spam, it is added to the filters as well (Whitney 2015.) 
This kind of a defense is only good against the regular phishing messages though 
as this experiment proved. The only program to actually classify the emails as 
spam in the end was Thunderbird, which I was using to check my own emails. 
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According to one co-worker his Airmail and Mail for Mac clients let the email 
straight through as did another co-worker’s Microsoft Outlook. 
The following screenshot depicts all of the recipients who actually opened the link 
in the email they received. In total 16 people visited the login portal I had set up. 
The people who also typed in their credentials or fake credentials show up twice 
on the list. The two visits from Japan were apparently caused by the antivirus 
software of one of the employees. 
 
Picture 9. People who opened the link and visited the login portal. 
Needless to say the number is worryingly big. This is way too big of a number 
considering the size of the target group. In this test I was using just a simple login 
portal, but like I mentioned earlier I could have set up a malicious JS on the page 
as well. 
Finally there were in total 9 people who used their real credentials in the login 
form and at least one of them an admin user. The number might have some error 
marginal but based on the passwords received I am fairly certain it is accurate. 
At least one of the employees was clever enough to use fake credentials and 
another one tried the form later on with fake credentials as well. The same person 
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also tried a Structured Query Language injection on the form. The results are 
visible in the screenshot below. 
 
Picture 10. People who submitted the login form. 
Based on the comments I received from some of the employees apparently my 
initial prediction had been pretty accurate and one department had gone into a 
total panic mode whereas the other department had one well-informed person 
who immediately spotted the phishing attempt and warned everyone else physi-
cally present. 
7.2 What to Improve 
First of all way too many people trusted the email right on the first sight. I had a 
discussion with one of the employees who had submitted their real credentials 
and according to him the email and the way it was written was spot on. Now I did 
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have a good look what the CEO’s emails looked like but that information could 
have easily been obtained just by sending him an email asking for a quote on 
some service for example. 
What is worrying is the lack of skepticism. The email did appear at first to come 
from the real address but everyone’s alarm bells should be ringing at least when 
the email contains a link. You should never ever open a link that you are not sure 
of where it leads. The real destination can always be seen just by hovering the 
mouse cursor over the link excluding the cases where the site behind the link 
redirects the user to some other site. 
As for the obtained real credentials this is something that should never happen. 
In the email the employees were instructed to use their work email credentials. 
Google’s credentials are never used in any other form than in Gmail login screen. 
In a real situation a 2-factor authentication would be an employee’s best friend 
as the attacker could not login even with the obtained credentials. This is some-
thing that should be mandatory in all of the company email accounts. 
I did not get much data on what the emergency response was inside the company 
as people realized they were tricked. What I have gathered is based on the dis-
cussions with several of the employees. Apparently there had been some panic 
at one department and people had been told to “change their credentials and run 
scans.” In the other department things had gone much more smoothly as one of 
the employees had spotted the ruse and alarmed others in the vicinity, though 
still the admin who worked in the same room had already typed in his real cre-
dentials. Based on this the things seemed to have gone pretty well but more order 
is still needed. For example the last one to put in his credentials did so even while 
the panic was still going on in one department and the other department had 
already learned that it was me behind the test. This should not happen, everyone 
needs to be informed immediately something like this happens so that they are 
well-prepared for it. The only way this can be achieved is to have rules to follow 
when incidents happen and all employees have to be aware of them as well as 
follow them at all times. 
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All in all the number of people successfully fooled surprised me but to my 
knowledge none of the employees had received previously any official training 
against phishing attempts so that needs to be taken into account. The good thing 
though is that these weak points came up in an internal review and not in a real 
incident. 
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8 HOW TO PROTECT ONESELF? 
As it became evident in the Phirelight phishing experiment, the best defenses 
against social engineering attacks are a healthy dose of skepticism and security 
awareness. I have already established in this thesis that the weakest link of any 
system is almost always its human component. In the experiment I analyzed the 
passwords that people had submitted and they were not in any way bad. All of 
them were over 8 characters long, they had upper and lower case letters as well 
as numbers and special characters and the longest one was almost 40 characters 
long. The passphrases can be over 100 characters long but they matter little if 
they are given away freely. To maintain a credible and good defense against so-
cial engineering people need to be aware of how it works and which things to 
watch out for. People need to have a good security awareness. 
8.1 Security Awareness 
Security awareness is not something you are born with. It is best obtained by 
learning how different SE attacks work and to maintain it, it has to be regularly 
tested. It is also as much about the individuals’ attitudes as it is about their know-
how (Cisco 2016). One of the Phirelight employees made a few fitting comments, 
and I quote, “I’m not sure if it really should count, because I mean it was clear 
CEO’d written it … If it was a phishing attempt it’d be like ‘get ur s3x pill5 hERE’ 
… or if the phisher was so good to have actually learned how CEO composes 
emails, and our recent hires, then I’d willingly give my info.” All joking aside this 
really is the problem. It never happens to me. What do I have the attackers could 
possibly want? I would not fall for it, I could see the scam a mile away! Several 
risky character traits seem to pop up constantly in different studies besides the 
ways people can be influenced outlined in the previous chapter on social tech-
niques. Some of the more common ones include over-confidence, pride, large 
ego and ignorance. The thing that should be realized is that there really is not a 
single human type that will fall a victim to social engineering. Anyone can be the 
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scammed one. All it takes for the attacker is to find the things that make you tick 
(Phys.org 2009; Fraud Aid Inc. 2014.) 
People need to understand that SE attacks are personal. The attacker knows the 
target or the target group and their habits. They know how the targets will react 
in certain situations or at least have a pretty good idea of it. This is why the secu-
rity is also a personal matter. It is a normal practice to have a department or some 
of the personnel responsible for the internal security since it is the cheaper option, 
but in a situation where all employees are targeted in an attack it barely hinders 
the attacker. No internal security department can possibly take into account every 
single interaction of the rest of the employees. The employees themselves have 
to be aware of the possible attacks and understand the risks involved. The re-
sponsibility of creating this kind of a mentality in the employees’ minds is on the 
executive branch of any company. People need to take responsibility for their 
actions as well and not just rely on Google’s automatic spam protection to keep 
their inbox clean and safe. 
8.2 Information Is Power 
The successful phishers are good. Granted the whole spear phishing experiment 
I carried out could be classified as a worst case scenario from Phirelight’s point 
of view but it is still not unreasonable to assume that the attacker could have 
obtained the information they had just by long and arduous leg work. For example 
the email addresses themselves are really easy to obtain just by first creating a 
list of known employees, which is a simple task to accomplish with public infor-
mation sources like LinkedIn. After creating the employee list it would be simple 
enough task to first grab a few known email addresses that are visible on the 
company website and make an educated guess based on them how the email 
addresses are formatted for the rest of the employees. This is why people should 
be well aware of what information exactly they put online for everyone to see. 
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One of the things that people often forget is that every little detail counts towards 
a greater goal. One office working employee might not have anything that inter-
esting on their compromised email account and their personal network drive 
might also be somewhat empty, but that does not matter since the attacker has 
already gained a foothold inside the company. Now they can use the completely 
legit email to send emails to the other employees or upload malicious files into 
the corporate network drive. 
Like I have already repeated many times people should value their own personal 
information. Facebook contrary to the popular belief is not free. Facebook mone-
tizes its services by selling its users’ information to the advertisers. The same 
goes with all of the social networks. LinkedIn is especially evil from the infor-
mation security point of view since people are willingly sharing their personal work 
history and details to anyone interested. It is a really quick task to see yourself 
how much information you can find online about yourself. The attacker is sure to 
find all that and perhaps even more. In today’s corporate environment the usage 
of LinkedIn seems to be almost mandatory and people need to maintain a Face-
book account to keep in touch with their friends. It still does not mean that you 
should just openly trust the services that you are using. Read their EULAs and 
investigate their privacy options because there are ways you can affect how much 
data you are giving out. In the end the advertisement industry will make sure that 
you are always leaking information but you do not have to make it too easy for 
them or anyone else for that matter. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
As I started writing this thesis I had the intention of creating a simple guide that 
could tell anyone how to protect themselves against social engineering. As I 
learned more about SE and the psychology behind it, it became apparent that the 
appearance of my thesis would be somewhat different from my original plan. The 
main problem is that there really is not just one thing to prepare for but instead 
as many ways to attack people and organizations with SE as the attacker comes 
up with. In software the holes and bugs can be fixed but there does not exist any 
service yet that would patch the human bugs and security holes. 
The best practice for defending against hackers is learning their tricks yourself so 
you will have a better understanding where your weak spots are. The same prin-
ciple is applicable in SE attacks but cannot be used in an entirely black and white 
environment where every compliment you receive is an attempt to manipulate 
you and every email contains a malicious attachment. People need to have a 
level of trust in their environment to function properly. The only way is to find the 
middle ground between paranoia and naïve trust. 
People will perhaps always remain as the weakest link in any chain, but they can 
also be its strongest ones. The fact that one employee started warning others of 
the phishing attempt during the experiment almost right away was something I 
did not anticipate, but it was something that should be the norm. This thesis was 
built on the shoulders of giants so it is only fitting I end it with a quote from perhaps 
the most well-known social engineer of our time Kevin Mitnick: “The methods that 
will most effectively minimize the ability of intruders to compromise information 
security are comprehensive user training and education. Enacting policies and 
procedures simply will not suffice. Even with oversight the policies and proce-
dures may not be effective: my access to Motorola, Nokia, ATT, Sun depended 
upon the willingness of people to bypass policies and procedures that were in 
place for years before I compromised them successfully.” 
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Appendix: Email exchange between a hacker and 
rootkit.com admin 
From: Greg Hoglund <greg@hbgary.com> ISun, Feb 6, 2011 at 1:59 PM 
To: jussi <jussij@gmail.com> 
  
im in europe and need to ssh into the server. can you drop open up 
firewall and allow ssh through port 59022 or something vague? 
and is our root password still 88j4bb3rw0cky88 or did we change to 
88Scr3am3r88 ? 
thanks 
  
From: jussi jaakonaho <jussij@gmail.com> ISun, Feb 6, 2011 at 2:06 PM 
To: Greg Hoglund <greg@hbgary.com> 
  
hi, do you have public ip? or should i just drop fw? 
and it is w0cky - tho no remote root access allowed 
  
From: Greg Hoglund <greg@hbgary.com> ISun, Feb 6, 2011 at 2:08 PM 
To: jussi jaakonaho <jussij@gmail.com> 
  
no i dont have the public ip with me at the moment because im ready 
for a small meeting and im in a rush. 
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if anything just reset my password to changeme123 and give me public 
ip and ill ssh in and reset my pw. 
  
From: jussi jaakonaho <jussij@gmail.com> ISun, Feb 6, 2011 at 2:10 PM 
To: Greg Hoglund <greg@hbgary.com> 
ok, 
takes couple mins, i will mail you when ready. ssh runs on 47152 
  
...a little later: 
  
bash-3.2# ssh hoglund@65.74.181.141 -p 47152 
[unauthorized access prohibited] 
hoglund@65.74.181.141's password: 
[hoglund@www hoglund]$ unset 
hoglund@www hoglund]$ w 
11:23:50  up 30 days,  5:45,  4 users,  load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00 
USER     TTY      FROM              LOGIN@   IDLE   JCPU   PCPU  WHAT 
jussi    pts/0    cs145060.pp.htv. Wed11pm 59.00s  0.38s  0.35s  screen -r 
jussi    pts/1    -                Thu 5am  1:13   0.38s  4.90s  SCREEN 
jussi    pts/2    -                Thu 5am 59.00s  0.68s  4.90s  SCREEN 
hoglund  pts/3    132.181.74.65.st 11:23am  0.00s  0.03s  0.00s  w 
[hoglund@www hoglund]$ unset HIST 
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[hoglund@www hoglund]$ unset HISTFLE 
[hoglund@www hoglund]$ unset HISTFILE 
[hoglund@www hoglund]$ uname -a;hostname 
Linux www.rootkit.com 2.4.21-40.ELsmp #1 SMP Wed Mar 15 14:21:45 EST 
2006 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux 
www.rootkit.com 
[hoglund@www hoglund]$ su - 
Password: 
[root@www root]# unset HIST 
[root@www root]# unset HISTFILE 
[root@www root]# uname -a;hostname;id 
Linux www.rootkit.com 2.4.21-40.ELsmp #1 SMP Wed Mar 15 14:21:45 EST 
2006 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux 
www.rootkit.com 
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1200(varmistus) 
 
